

FLUXING THE LOGIC OF DEFINITIVE DIFFERENCES

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Abstract:

Focusing on Fluxus, a loosely knit association of artists from America, Europe and Asia whose work centers around intermediality, this article explores the notion of relationality without *relata*. Intermediality refers to works that fall conceptually *between* media – such as visual poetry or action music – as well as *between* the general area of art media and those of life media (Higgins). Departing from two Fluxus intermedia – *the event score*, a performative score in the form of words, and the *Fluxkit*, a performative score in the form of objects – I investigate the logic of co-constitutivity within which every element is both subject and object, both constitutive and constituted. To be more precise, I trace the cross-categorical interplay of differences that explodes the logico-linguistic structure of binary oppositions, such as those between foreground and background, word and action, sound and silence, identity and alterity. Aided by Jacques Derrida's concept of 'de-centered play' and Shigenori Nagatomo's concept of 'interfusion' this article seeks to articulate the ways in which the Fluxus works mobilise the 'silent background' to dismantle the dualistic logic of definite differences.

Keywords: art, intermediality, deconstruction, co-constitutivity

Résumé:

En se penchant sur Fluxus, une association d'artistes de l'Europe, de l'Amérique et de l'Asie, dont l'œuvre tourne autour de l'intermédialité, cet article examine la notion de la relationalité sans *relata*. L'intermédialité désigne les œuvres qui tombent conceptuellement entre les disciplines artistiques – la poésie visuelle ou "action music" – aussi bien qu'entre le champ général des disciplines artistiques et celles de la vie (Higgins). En prenant comme point de départ deux intermedia Fluxus – *the event score* (une partition performative qui prend la forme des mots) et le *Fluxkit* (une partition performative qui prend la forme des objets) – j'aborde la logique de la co-constitutivité. Dans cette logique chaque élément fonctionne comme sujet autant qu'objet, à la fois constitué et constituant. Pour en être plus précise, je trace le jeu des différences qui fait éclater la structure logico-linguistique des oppositions binaires, telles que l'opposition de l'avant-plan à arrière-plan, la parole à l'action, le son au silence, l'identité à l'altérité. En utilisant le concept du jeu décentré (Jacques Derrida) et celui d'interfusion (Shigenori Nagatomo), je cherche à articuler comment les œuvres Fluxus mobilisent l' "arrière-plan silencieux" afin de déconstruire la logique dualiste des différences définies.

Mots-clé: l'art, intermédialité, déconstruction, co-constitutivité

“Just as today we listen to the song of the forest and the sea so tomorrow
shall we be seduced by the vibrations of a diamond or a flower.”

Luigi Russolo

I. Introduction

In 1951 the American experimental composer John Cage visited the anechoic chamber at Harvard University. An anechoic chamber is designed to absorb sounds; it is internally and externally soundproofed. Cage entered the chamber expecting to hear silence but, instead, heard two sounds, one high and one low. When he enquired after the origin of these sounds, he was told that the high sound was his nervous system in operation, the low one his blood in circulation. Soon after this Cage composed his seminal *4'33"* which reads:

I
TACET

II
TACET

III
TACET

1952

The score instructs the performer to remain silent during three movements, the word “tacet” referring to the section during which an instrument is not required to play. At the first performance of *4'33"* in Woodstock in 1952 the pianist David Tudor closed the lid of the piano keyboard at the beginning of each period and raised it again at the end of each time period.

On this occasion the “silence” indicated by the score consisted of a multitude of ambient sounds and the growing restlessness of the audience. Following in the tradition of the Italian Futurists who exploded the frame of what had hitherto been considered “music” to include the subtle noises of nature and the brutal noises of the modern city, Cage’s seminal score articulated three important notions. First, that “music” is a socio-political construct, part of a divisionary mechanism which segregates the culturally acceptable from the culturally unacceptable and that once this divisionary mechanism is removed, all sounds are, in fact, “music”. Second, that “music” is not confined to aural phenomena only but extends to all events in soundspace; visual, olfactory and tactile phenomena in-

cluded. Third, that there is no silence and no “background”. All three of these notions bear strongly on Fluxus, a loosely knit association of artists whose work follows closely in Cage’s footsteps, spans the period of five decades, includes artists from Europe, America and Asia, and centers around intermediality. According to the Fluxus artist and theorist Dick Higgins who coined the term, intermediality refers to works that fall conceptually *between* media – such as visual poetry or action music – as well as *between* “the general area of art media and those of life media” (“Intermedia” 49). Like Cage, who was profoundly influenced by the teachings of the Zen master D.T. Suzuki, such as the non-linear nature of cause and effect and the interpenetration of all things in time-space, the Fluxus artists were acutely aware of the fact that there can be no such thing as “background”, “silence” and “non-content”. Furthermore, they were acutely aware of the fact that these divisionary concepts formed part of an “is” and “is not” logic, which, as the Japanese philosopher Keiji Nishitani aptly points out, stems from the “two world theory” (77). Essentially, the “two world theory” is the cornerstone of the Western metaphysical tradition.

It is rooted in the emanation theory which postulates that finite human beings are created from a primordial overflowing, or emanation, from the One, the source of all being. The existence of the One further entails a hierarchical separation of the world of essence, infinity and eternity from the world of appearance and finitude. On the one hand, the finite world of appearance marks the degree of separation from the One. On the other, it institutes the logic of parts and wholes. A whole is thus a superior term because it denotes plenitude (the presence of all parts), a part an inferior one because it denotes incompleteness. Despite the fact that the emanation theory has long since lost currency, the binary logic of “is” and “is not” and its corresponding separation of identity from alterity, mind from body, centre from periphery, foreground from background, persists in a variety of guises to this very day.

The Fluxus artists sought to dismantle these deeply dualistic and hierarchical constructs and in their stead introduce interpenetration and de-centered play. The notion of de-centered play is synonymous with deconstruction, a critical strategy developed by Jacques Derrida to dethrone all notions of “self-identity” which form part of the dominant category of the Western episteme – being. Based on the logic of *différance* which resonates with two simultaneous meanings: to differ – to be different from, and to defer – to postpone, to delay, this strategy seeks to demonstrate how any category of being, presence or identity can be deconstructed into a “play of differences”. In *Positions*, Derrida offers the following definition: “[d]ifférance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other” (27). This further means that no sign is absolutely identical with itself but, instead, disseminates into an endless chain of differences and that the meaning of a sign is always deferred.

In this sense, *différance* is a rupture in the substance- and presence-privileging structure, which, by exposing the play of differences, prevents reduction to an ultimate mean-

ing. This is why the strategy of deconstruction is also a strategy of de-centering, since a “centre” is any sign conceptualised as having absolute self-identity.

In Fluxus terms, this strategy consists of dissolving the self-identical logic of any given artistic medium into a multitude of *différant* relationships. To be more precise, it consists of dissolving the ‘medium-inherent properties’, e.g. colour in the case of painting; shape, texture, movement and colour in the case of sculpture; movement, rhythm, form and composition in the case of dance, into a web of *mutually structuring* relationships. How this operates can be seen in scores such as Dick Higgins’

DANGER MUSIC NUMBER FIFTEEN
(For the Dance)

Work with butter and eggs for a time

1962

Or, George Brecht’s

TWO DURATIONS

- Red
- Green

1961

Both Higgins and Brecht attended Cage’s 1958–59 class in Experimental Composition at the New School for Social Research in New York. It could thus be argued that the above scores represent a logical continuation of Cage’s thought. However, as Brecht elucidates in an interview with Irmeline Leeber: “Cage was a great liberator” (Brecht 83) “but he remained a musician, a composer [...] life is much larger than music. Afterwards I tried to develop the ideas that I’d had during Cage’s course and that’s where my “events” came from [...] Events are an extension of music.” (84). Clearly, what Brecht sought was a more overt and more expansive form of transitivity. Much like Higgins’ *Danger Music Number Fifteen*, his own *Two Durations* trigger an explicit “intermedial dialectic” by applying the perceptual lens traditionally associated with music to “properties” traditionally associated with painting, sculpture and dance. In doing so these *event scores* not only alter the relationship between the different media, they also erode the boundary between the

so-called artistic media and life media. In other words, they explode the “playing field” of de-centered play.

II. Exploding the Linguistic Playing Field

Within the dualist paradigm derived from the “two world theory” language is conceptualised as a *tool* of expression. That language is a tool of expression means that it serves both as a *container* and a *conveyer* of the inner workings of human consciousness. Within the privileged realm of internality – the realm of *res cogitans* – immaterial ideas take shape. These ideas, which originate in the world of transcendence, are then ex-pressed, injected into words whose purpose is to disseminate their immaterial content in the material world of immanence.

The process of dissemination is thus also a process of externalisation and this process is distinctly unilateral. In order to keep the unilateral relationship in place, grammatical – thus relationship-determining – rules are applied exclusively to spoken and written signs at the expense of all other forms of linguistic relationality: gestures, movements, actions, objects, sounds and silences. The result of this fixed, unilateral and exclusionary relationship is a definite *frame* within which the subject’s chosen content is expressed and which separates this content from non-content. A text or a poem with a definite frame thus functions as a privileged site of interpretation where the listener/viewer/reader is invited to perform the work of deciphering “the message”. However, as Dick Higgins elucidates in “Theory and Reception”, the *event score*, of which *Danger Music Number Fifteen* and *Two Durations* are examples, does not form part of what might be termed the “expressive paradigm”. The reason for this is that the *event score* “does not attempt to express a vision of a world transformed by imagination or feeling” nor does it “attempt to express the artist emotionally or intellectually” (Higgins, “Fluxus” 228).

An empirical proof of this statement can be obtained within seconds if we attempt to determine the *content* of Brecht’s

THREE GAP EVENTS

- missing-letter sign
- between two sounds
- meeting again

1961

A quick application of questions such as “what is being expressed here?” and “what content or meaning is being conveyed?” will hardly reveal much more than the fact that the title points to a seeming contradiction in terms, since, according to the Oxford Dictionary, a gap is “an unfilled space or interval, a blank, a gorge, a pass, a break in continuity” (Fowler 503). An event, on the other hand, is “an occurrence, a thing that happens, a fact of a thing’s happening” (418). This makes the combination of the two words oxymoronic and settles their apparent irreconcilability whilst simultaneously indicating a semantic slipperiness, if not a semantic vacuum. If we continue the same line of investigation we will come up against three disparate categories of sign, sound and action; namely “missing-letter sign”, “between two sounds”, and “meeting again”. Apart from detecting a certain progression in complexity from a written sign – an object – to an acoustic occurrence – a performance – to a situation which may include both objects and performance, the quest to determine the content or the meaning of *Three Gap Events* will not get us very far. Higgins is once again instructive when he says that “meaning is not the point in a Fluxpiece” (Higgins, “Fluxus” 229) and that “the conveyors of meaning are often so incidental as to make the semiotics of a Fluxpiece problematic or even irrelevant” (229).

But there is more at play than an incidental suspension of semiosis. The quest for meaning is also a quest for stabilisation, for anchoring and a determination of a centre. As Jacques Derrida notes in *Writing and Difference* the function of a centre is not only to “orient, balance, and organize the structure ... but above all make sure that the organizing principle would limit what we might call the *play* of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form” (352, emphasis original). Whilst the play of semiosis allows for a plurality of interpretations, its structure, in other words its “total form” (which is what determines the scope of play), is itself predetermined by the governing principle to which semiosis is subordinated.

The quest to determine the meaning of a word, sentence or text is thus an attempt to delineate the ‘fundamental ground’ where, as Derrida elucidates, play is “constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude which itself is beyond the reach of play” (352). Instead of operating on the basis of a “reassuring certitude” and a centre which remains “beyond the reach of play”, the *event score* de-centers the playing field and in doing so explodes the very structurality of structure. How this is done can, once again, be empirically established.

If instead of the “what” questions, we approach the above score with a “how” question, *Three Gap Events* will begin to unfold in an altogether different light – as a path, an activity, a process and a *modus operandi*. Asking “how does this work?” will reveal two parallel structuring processes – spacing and temporisation. Although intertwined, these processes can, for clarity’s sake, be described as spatio-temporal extensions of gap-ness and event-ness respectively. On the one hand, there is the process of withdrawing, of

dropping into a temporary caesura and absence. On the other, the process of perpetuating or amplifying the duration of a thing's happening. Thus seen, the first of Brecht's *Three Gap Events* – “missing letter” – functions as an ongoing structuring activity of eventful suspension of that which once occupied or might have occupied the place of the missing letter sign. “Eventful suspension” is in this case comparable to the movement of ascending a descending staircase where the motion may appear “arrested” from the point of view of linear progression, but is, in fact, minutely structured in spatio-temporal terms. The second *gap event* – “between two sounds” – operates through a similarly minutely structured, expectant suspension of audible sensations and is, in this sense, pregnant with sound whose absence it articulates. The third gap event – “meeting again” – unfolds as an eventful suspension of physical, visual, aural, tactile and olfactory contact between human beings, objects and/or animals, thus making the act of “meeting again” pregnant with the “volume” of being apart.

Seen in this way, each of the three contexts constituting the playing field of *Three Gap Events* appears as a vibrant nexus of perpetual spatio-temporal structuring, happening and event-hood. Within the expressive paradigm, however, this is seen as non-expressive, empty of content, thus silent and non-existent. Brecht, who was the first to articulate the term “event score”, but who was also a practising chemist, would invariably have been familiar with the notion of events derived from physics where an event is, quite simply, a point taken from three-dimensions to four-dimensions. Whereas “three-dimensions” does not have an explicitly articulated temporal dimension – in other words, it does not involve a performed action – “four-dimensions” does. A light switch is thus a three-dimensional situation, but the switching on of light a four-dimensional one. Like any other four-dimensional situation, a simple event like the switching on of light is prone to felicitous as well as infelicitous occurrences. This further indicates its essentially unstable, and, to a large extent, unpredictable nature. In *Mémoire pour Paul de Man*, Derrida suggests that an event is “nothing of which it might be possible to say: ‘this is’ (with any complement of being) in the way that Hegel was able to say ‘this is an oak in which we discern the development of an acorn’” (*Mémoire...* 152). Rather, it is “the evaporation (échéance) of any variety of acorns ... [an event] is unique and unforeseeable, free of ulterior expectations and in no way subject to teleological maturation: an oak that has nothing to do with any acorn” (152).

The fact that an event cannot easily be anchored to a teleological structure is crucial to understanding why the *event score* resists closure and how it explodes the playing field. If, while reading *Three Gap Events* we are sensitised to sound and discern the sound of a crying baby emerging from the sea of traffic coming through the window, we might focus on it, tune into its density, follow its crescendo or decrescendo and notice when it stops. The sudden withdrawal of this particular sound may make us focus on other sounds with expectant attention. During this state of suspension, while trying to discern

whether the sound of a crying baby is likely to resurface, we might notice that an empty paper coffee cup is lying on our desk. While focusing on the dense fabric of sound as well as expecting the sound of a crying baby to reappear at any moment, we may also walk over to the rubbish bin and place the coffee cup in it. During the period of time which started with the sound of the crying baby and ended with our walking back from the bin, the playing field of the score would have included auditory, visual, kinaesthetic and tactile events. An obvious objection to this argument is, of course, that we could have engaged in exactly the same activity or focused on the same sensory data while reading any other text or poem and that this does not necessarily indicate an expanded playing field. The reason why this is not the case is that if instead of reading *Three Gap Events* we read a lyrical poem such as *I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud* by William Wordsworth, whose form is expressive and which communicates the poet's feelings about the beauty of nature, aroused by the sight of golden daffodils "fluttering and dancing in the breeze" (Wordsworth 5) we could, indeed, engage in exactly the same activities or focus on the same sounds whilst inhabiting the imaginary world of the fluttering daffodils, but these activities and sounds would be incidental. By evoking the world of daffodils that "stretch in never-ending line", "continuous as the stars that shine and twinkle on the milky way" (6), Wordsworth's poem creates a very specific *frame* to which the reader's attention is drawn and which makes any occurrence outside the frame incidental, secondary or even inconsequential. In other words, despite the fact that we may pick up a coffee cup and put it in the bin whilst simultaneously inhabiting Wordsworth's world of "golden daffodils" we are highly unlikely to think of the poem as "framing" golden daffodils, coffee cups and rubbish bins in equal measure.

The reason why *Three Gap Events* may be said to explode the playing field is precisely because the event of a crying baby or of putting a coffee cup in the rubbish bin is as much a part of the 'frame' as anything else. The absence of any particular content – and thereby also frame which separates this content from all other non-content – in *Three Gap Events* thematises and renders *equally relevant* all events constitutive of the percipient's environment. In other words, it thematises the background, the silence. Since in the field of de-centered play there is no segregation between "content" and "non-content", there is no limit on the variety of occurrences, performances, imaginings and/or recollections that may become "the content" of the event. In this sense, the *event score* initiates a (potentially) limitless interplay of *différance*, of spacing, temporisation and cross-categorical interpenetration. Closely related to the *event score* is this respect is another notable Fluxus intermedium – the *Fluxkit*.

III. Exploding the Corporeal Playing Field

A performative score in the form of objects, usually no larger than a briefcase, the *Fluxkit* dismantles the binary opposition between “event” and “object”, since, to cite George Brecht once again, “[e]very object is an event... and every event has an object-like quality” (Brecht, 1978: 106). In fact, the *Fluxkit* can be traced to Brecht’s famous *Repository*, a disparate collection of *objets trouvés* (found objects), such as word puzzles, playing cards, toothbrushes, light bulbs and thermostats, first created in 1961, at the same time as Brecht’s first *event scores*. Like the *event score*, the *Fluxkit*, of which Larry Miller’s *Orifice Flux Plugs* (Fig. 1) is an example, dismantles a host of binary oppositions such as those between internality and externality, sameness and otherness, subject and object.




Figura 1

Larry Miller *Orifice Flux Plugs*, 1974. Design by George Maciunas. Courtesy of the artist.

Here, the work of cross-categorical tracing or *différance* – of spacing, temporalisation and the interpenetration of foreground and background, form and emptiness, sound and silence – operates by way of attunement as theorised by the Japanese philosopher Shigenori Nagatomo. In *Attunement Through the Body* Nagatomo defines the notion of “attunement” as “engagement that obtains actionally as well as epistemologically between a person and his/her living ambience” (179), where the word “person” refers to an “entity of psycho-physical integration” (179) and the phrase “living ambience” to “the totality of shaped things, either animate or inanimate” (179).

The process of attunement is a process of sedimentation of “affective residue”, achieved through the “experiential momentum” (198). It is repeated engagement in particular somatic structures which impregnates the body posturally and sensorially and in this way configures the body’s future engagement with the living ambience. This continuous creation of a variety of somatic-affective paths stems from Nagatomo’s interpretation of Hiroshi Ichikawa’s concept of *seishin toshite no shintai*, which means “body as spirit” (5). Much like in Western phenomenology, there are two modalities of the body – *shukan shintai* or the “subject-body” which could be described as the body we *are*; and *kyakutai toshite no shintai* or the “object-body”, which could be described as the body we *have* (6). *Shukan shintai* is lived from within and consists of a multitude of different horizons, ranging from the “bright horizon of consciousness” to the “obscure, hazy horizon” (Ichikawa cited in Nagatomo 6). The reference to the various degrees of discernibility and opaqueness signifies a range of *existential modalities*, from clearly formed intentions which presuppose a distance, to the opaque moods or feelings in which the “subject body” merges with the stimuli and where there is no “object of consciousness”. In this sense, the subject-body is a continuum engaged in a continuous dialogue with what is “actual” and what is “possible” and as such the basis of both voluntary and involuntary actions (12-14). Nagatomo stresses the importance of this *dialogue* which replaces the active-passive polarity with a form of dialectical, mutually constitutive ambiguity. In order for an intimacy to occur – the process of familiarisation resulting in the sense of knowing – a mutual configuration between the “object-body” and another shaped object has to take place. These dialogical positions are important for understanding the *reversibility of positions* with which the notion of the “body as spirit” is imbued. The example that Nagatomo provides, after Ichikawa, is that of double sensation. If we touch our foot, we can feel both our hand touching the foot and the foot being touched. Double sensation thus:

involves a subject that is touching an object that is being touched, when both the subject and object pertain to one and the same body ... This will provide an occasion for reflection, for reflection requires precisely that which does the reflecting and that which is reflected upon. Moreover, it can be seen as an ‘externalized reflection’ because the subject-object dichotomy takes place on the surface of the clearly delineated physical boundary of the body (21).

In other words, it is in the sensation of the foot which is being touched by the hand that the “externalized reflection” occurs. However, this externality is subsequently reversed and the reflection is *internalised*, since after reflecting on the fact that it is our hand touching our foot we also note that it is *us* realising that it is *our* hand touching *our* foot. At this point the “I” realising the “I” touching occurs at a level not fully available to transparent consciousness, since transparent consciousness requires an *intentional distancing* from the object of its contemplation. Furthermore, what appears in this state of not-entirely-transparent

consciousness is the *interchangeability* of the “externalised” and “internalised” positions. That is to say that the “I” feeling myself touching my foot and the “I” feeling my foot being touched, are exactly the same. Nagatomo calls this the “*interfusion*” of the “subject-body” and the “object-body” (23). “Interfusion” thus unifies selfhood and mine-ness and, importantly, arises from the “hazy horizon of consciousness” (26).

Larry Miller’s 1974 kit entitled *Orifice Flux Plugs*, which is an exploration of what might be called the “living body’s” hidden somaticity, its “background”, its “silence”, so to speak, elucidates this “hidden” process of interfusion and its passage from the hazy to the clear horizon of consciousness. Packed in a 9 x 12 inch transparent plastic box, *Orifice Flux Plugs* consists of earplugs, nose plugs, a mouth plug (a cork-like object of about 2,5 inches in diameter), pacifiers, tampons, condoms, the different forms of anus plugs varying from finger-shaped objects to old fashioned thermometers, a blindfold and a few tiny statuettes that may fit into any of the aforementioned orifices. Interoception, as opposed to exteroception, which opens up our body to the external world, includes all sensations of the “internal world”, the viscera such as hunger, thirst, pain, temperature, “air hunger” (the body’s need for a sufficient amount of oxygen) and vasomotor activity. Due to the fact that the main interoceptive function is to motivate behaviours needed for the maintenance of homeostasis, we are mostly unaware of its existence. In *The Absent Body*, a phenomenological study of the paradoxical absence of the body from thematic experience, since the body “constitutes a null point in the world I inhabit” (13), Drew Leder offers a lucid example of the secrecy of interoception as compared to exteroception. An apple, which can be seen, smelled, touched and tasted, once swallowed, not only disappears from the field of exteroceptive experience, but disappears altogether, unless a digestive disturbance occurs (39). It fades into the “background” and becomes imperceptible and “silent”.

In other words, the moment the external world becomes a *constituent part* of the body it is lost to its experiential field. Miller’s score offers an exploration of this recessive dimension, which in Nagatomo’s terminology corresponds to the hazy horizon of consciousness. The plugs can either be used selectively and consecutively, or, all at once. However, if we insert only the ear plugs – since, as the Fluxus scholar Hannah Higgins rightly notes, the invariable question which arises in conjunction with Miller’s *Orifice Plugs* is: “[w]hat if this is used?” (Higgins, H. 34) – and close our eyes, we will suddenly be able to hear the inside of our body, its “silent background” – the clicking of the jaw or the shoulder blade as we set it in motion, the opening and the closing or the larynx when swallowing saliva, the incessant workings of the stomach and the intestines. We will also be able to feel the expansion and the maximum circumference of our lungs as we inhale and a mixture of pressure and release as we exhale. If we begin to move parts of the body even the tiniest movement will feel enormous because there is no exteroceptive reference to spatial coordinates. Generally, in this state of temporary “exemptness” from the world,

that is to say from exteroceptive participation in it, and lacking the usual “cues”, our body will feel much larger. The longer we spend in this state the more we will be able to discern the tiniest *events* in the body, such as an itching palette or a twitch in the calf. We will even be able to feel the incessant motion of our body – the beating of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the movement of food through the digestive tract, the movement of fluids and lipids through the lymphic system. The more finely tuned our interoception, the richer the *event* will be. If we spend a while longer in this state we will even be able to feel the position and movement of some of the less “noisy” organs, such as the kidneys. Miller’s score is in many ways comparable to Cage’s 1963 *0’00” (4’33” No. 2)* which replaces what Cage has termed ‘old music’, the music that has to do with “*conceptions and their communication*” (Cage cited in Nyman 20, emphasis original) with “new music which has to do with *perception* and the arousing of it in us” (20). In Cage’s own words, *0’00”* is “nothing but the continuation of one’s daily work, whatever it is ... done with contact microphones, without any notion of concert or theater or the public, but simply continuing one’s daily work, now coming out through loudspeakers” (Kostelanetz 69-70). In this sense, Miller’s score not only thematises that which is usually thought to be the imperceptible background, silence or null-point-ness, to use Leder’s expression, it draws the percipient’s attention to the very *processuality* of perception denoted by Nagatomo’s concept of “interfusion” as the passage from the “hazy” to the “clear horizon of consciousness”. The more attentive we are to the workings of the “recessive body” and the “hazy horizon of consciousness”, the more aware of the variety of produced *events* we become. The more qualitatively and quantitatively aware of the full variety of our internal event-hood we are, the lesser the opaqueness and the greater the discernibility of the “hazy horizon of consciousness”. In this sense, the exploration afforded by Miller’s score breaks open a new attentional path, which, once established, cannot be erased, since once our perception has reached the “clear horizon of consciousness”, capable of distancing itself from the “object” of its perception, or, once we have become fully conscious of something and know it, we cannot “unknow” it. The difference between this form of knowledge derived from interfusion in which self-hood and mine-ness are integrated, rather than that derived from, say, medical journals depicting the internal workings of the human body (as a way of representing to remote consciousness that which is not readily available to exteroceptive perception) is the difference of *concern*.

What the qualitative and directional transformation of attention proposed by Miller’s score further signifies is a shift in the “null point-ness” of the body, which is no longer seen as unrelated to our sense of self and therefore not a matter of concern or care, unless provoked by a malfunctioning or disturbance. Sensing and knowing, thus being implicated and being concerned with the inner workings of the body, its background and “silence” means being concerned with an unfamiliar territory, a field of “otherness”, which is nevertheless a part of mine-ness and thus also selfhood. Paradoxically, that which is the

least accessible to “clear consciousness” permeates it through and through and is, in fact, its condition of possibility. The fluidity of the boundary between this “otherness” and integrated selfhood and mine-ness is equivalent to the inseparable connected-ness between the hazy and the clear horizons of consciousness, itself comparable to the inseparable connected-ness between silence and sound. Silence is not the opposite of sound; it is its condition of possibility. This means that “knowing” and “sensing” are imbued with “not knowing” and “not sensing” and that, conversely, “not knowing” and “not sensing” are always already imbued with “knowing” and “sensing”.

IV. Conclusion

Just as silence is always already pregnant with sound, corporeality is pregnant with spirituality, object-hood with event-hood, language with colour, shape, sound, rhythm and action. By abolishing the logic of the frame, in other words by abolishing the dualistic logic of definite differences, the Fluxus works, of which Brecht’s *Three Gap Events* and Miller’s *Flux Orifice Plugs* are but examples, thematise co-constitutivity. Essentially, co-constitutivity is an incessant interplay of *différance*; it is an of-of-of relation in which each notion - be it “word”, “deed”, “self”, “other”, “inside”, “outside”, “same”, “different”, “sound” or “silence” - is both subject and object, both constitutive and constituted. This constant interplay or cross-pollination of diverse forces and factors draws the percipient’s attention to the fundamental instability of parameters which constitute categories, appearances and perspectives. It draws the percipient’s attention to the fact that there are no stable or permanent categories and thus also no impermeable entities or identities. What the Fluxus works do is bring into evidence the possibility of a *relationality without relata*. They illuminate the fact that any given constitution is unstable and ephemeral because of the way it comes into being, be that constitution art, life, subject, object, event or process. In other words, these works illuminate the functioning of relationality as a continual mixing and interpenetration of cross-pollinating factors, with no reductive merging of difference.

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