Da certeza e doublethink : Orwell e Wittgenstein
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2007
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Edições Universitárias Lusófonas
Resumo
É meu objectivo, neste artigo, voltar a considerar a noção de Doublethink de Orwell, com referência ao pensamento posterior de Ludwig Wittgenstein. No mundo perturbado de Doublethink que Orwell descreve em Mil Novecentos e Oitenta e Quatro, muitas vezes parece que certeza sobre qualquer coisa se tornou impossível, estando tudo aberto à dúvida. Na verdade, defendo que a certeza é mais fundamental ao Doublethink do que a dúvida, e que Doublethink em Mil Novecentos e Oitenta e Quatro surge frequentemente porque as certezas das personagens chocam com coisas das quais seria muito mais lógico duvidar. Embora alguns aspectos do pensamento de Wittgenstein sobre crença pareceriam deixar muito pouco espaço para o fenómeno de Doublethink, noutros aspectos uma compreensão Wittgensteiniana de crença, conhecimento e certeza constitui uma boa posição para o analisar. Tanto Wittgenstein como Orwell exploram a relação entre verdade e conhecimento, certeza e crença como ligada à relação entre verdade e linguagem, comportamento e prática social.
It will be my aim in this paper to revisit Orwell’s notion of Doublethink with reference to the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the unhinged world of Doublethink that Orwell describes in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it often seems as if certainty about anything has become impossible, and that everything is open to doubt. In actual fact, I maintain that certainty is more fundamental to Doublethink than doubt, and that Doublethink in Nineteen Eighty-Four frequently arises because the characters” certainties are at odds with things it would be far more logical to doubt. Although some aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought about belief seem to make little room for the phenomenon of Doublethink, in certain respects a Wittgensteinian understanding of belief, knowledge and certainty provides a good position form which to analyse it. I would argue that both Wittgenstein and Orwell explore the relationship between truth and knowledge, certainty and belief as bound up with the relationship between truth and language, behaviour and social practice.
It will be my aim in this paper to revisit Orwell’s notion of Doublethink with reference to the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the unhinged world of Doublethink that Orwell describes in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it often seems as if certainty about anything has become impossible, and that everything is open to doubt. In actual fact, I maintain that certainty is more fundamental to Doublethink than doubt, and that Doublethink in Nineteen Eighty-Four frequently arises because the characters” certainties are at odds with things it would be far more logical to doubt. Although some aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought about belief seem to make little room for the phenomenon of Doublethink, in certain respects a Wittgensteinian understanding of belief, knowledge and certainty provides a good position form which to analyse it. I would argue that both Wittgenstein and Orwell explore the relationship between truth and knowledge, certainty and belief as bound up with the relationship between truth and language, behaviour and social practice.
Descrição
Caleidoscópio : Revista de Comunicação e Cultura
Palavras-chave
COMUNICAÇÃO, PENSAMENTO CONTEMPORÂNEO, FILOSOFIA, ORWELL, GEORGE, WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG, COMMUNICATION, CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHY
Citação
Rudrum , D 2007 , ' Da certeza e doublethink : Orwell e Wittgenstein ' , Caleidoscópio : Revista de Comunicação e Cultura .